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T he highly publicized problems of
Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in 1998 have once again fo-
cused the attention of policymakers and
the financial press on the hedge fund
industry. LTCM’s sudden fall from grace
has made for colorful reading, in part
because its principals include Nobel lau-
reates Robert Merton and Myron
Scholes. Interest was heightened by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s
involvement in coordinating LTCM’s
short-term rescue by 15 large banks and
security firms. The New York Fed later
justified its participation on the grounds
that “an abrupt and disorderly liquida-
tion would have posed unacceptable
risks to the American economy.”1
This is not the first time, however, that
policymakers have expressed concern
over the role of hedge funds in financial
markets.2 Critics allege that hedge
funds have increased the volatility and
decreased the stability of financial mar-
kets. Further, they maintain that hedge
funds played a major role in the cur-
rency crises of the 1990s and contribute
to the increased volatility of foreign-
exchange, equity, and debt markets.
These claims, however, have not with-
stood close examination.
In this Economic Commentary, we exam-
ine some of the rationales for closer
direct supervision of hedge funds. We
first provide an overview of the industry,
contrasting hedge funds with mutual
funds; we go on to discuss the structure
of hedge funds and examine their strate-
gies. We conclude by describing the cur-
rent regulatory environment for hedge
funds and discussing the issue of in-
creased regulatory scrutiny. 
n n A Primer on Hedge Funds
Hedge funds and mutual funds, both pri-
vate investment pools, are organized
under the Investment Company Act of
1940 and regulated under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. However, private invest-
ment pools that limit ownership to 100
high-net-worth investors and do not issue
securities to the public are exempted
from such regulations.3 The National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996 removed the restriction on the
number of qualified investors for hedge
funds. However, it is common practice
among hedge funds to limit the number
of investors to 500 in order to be consid-
ered a private offering under the Securi-
ties Act. Qualified investors include
individuals with at least $5 million in
capital and institutional investors (such
as mutual funds, pension funds, and col-
lege endowment funds) with at least $25
million in capital.
Hedge funds are further distinguished
from mutual funds by the following:
• Hedge funds are not limited in the
financial assets they may hold, in-
cluding derivative securities.
• Hedge funds face no restrictions on
short sales.
• Hedge funds may be highly leveraged.
• Fund managers’ compensation is based
on the fund’s financial performance.
• Hedge funds may limit withdrawals.
The first hedge fund, begun by Alfred
Winslow Jones in 1949, was a market-
neutral fund.4 Jones’ strategy was to
buy securities that were undervalued and
to sell short others (see table 1). The
securities sold short provided a natural
hedge against market risk and provided
Jones with some of the funding for his
portfolio. Today, in addition to market-
neutral funds, which structure their port-
folios to eliminate gains and losses
resulting from general movements, there
are seven other types of hedge funds
(defined by their investment strategy)
operating domestically and abroad.
These fund strategies are summarized in
table 2. As hedge funds do not report
financial data to the SEC, the exact num-
ber of funds in existence and their total
assets managed can only be estimated. 
A recent IMF study estimated that in
1997 there were roughly 1,100 hedge
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bles of Long Term Capital Manage-
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nomic Commentary refutes some of
the commonly held myths about
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nale for their regulation.TABLE 2 TYPES OF HEDGE FUNDS
Macro Funds that take positions on macroeconomic conditions around the
world.
Global Funds that take positions in regions of the world, including emerging
markets.
Long only  Funds that buy securities they have identified as undervalued, but do
not hedge their position.
Short only Funds that sell securities they have identified as overvalued, but do not
hedge their position.
Market- Funds (like the original Jones funds) that take offsetting positions in 
neutral closely related financial instruments.
Sectoral Funds that specialize in a particular industry or closely related
industries.
Event- Funds that capitalize on market mispricing related to a specific event, 
driven such as a merger or bankruptcy.
Funds of Hedge funds that invest solely in other hedge funds.
funds
NOTE: For a more detailed description of the different investment styles employed by hedge funds, see
Chadha and Jansen (1998).
funds with a combined capitalization of
nearly $110 billion.5 The relative size of
each type of fund—in terms of the num-
ber of funds and assets under manage-
ment through 1997—is shown in figures
1 and 2, respectively.
The most notorious of the hedge funds
are the large macro funds. Though few in
number, these funds are by far the largest
in average size and are operated by some
of the more “colorful” individuals in the
world of finance. The strategy behind
macro funds is to place bets on global
macroeconomic conditions. For example,
if fund managers expect economic condi-
tions in one country to lead to a currency
devaluation, they would take a short
position in that currency—typically by
selling futures contracts.6 With the ex-
ception of the “funds of funds”—which
invest in other hedge funds—hedge
funds make money by arbitraging unex-
plained price differences between closely
related securities. For example, if the risk
premium on BBB-rated bonds was
thought too high relative to AAA-rated
bonds, then a market-neutral fund would
buy the BBB-rated bonds and sell AAA-
rated bonds short, whereas a long-only
fund would buy the BBB-rate bonds, and
a short-only fund would sell the AAA-
rated bonds short. In all three cases, the
effect would be a decrease in the price
differential between the BBB-rated  
and the AAA-rated bonds, thus reducing
the relative risk premium on the lower-
grade instruments.
n n Hedge Fund Myths
Critics of the hedge fund industry con-
tend that these funds’ activities have neg-
ative consequences for markets and for
the economy. Martin Mayer, talking
about LTCM, expressed one view on the
value of the industry: “It is probably
worth noting that the work done at
LTCM, while not illegal or sinful, was
without redeeming social value.”7 Calls
for increased regulation or more direct
government oversight of the industry are
often based on commonly held, but
largely unsubstantiated, beliefs about
hedge funds.
Myth #1: All Hedge Funds Are
Highly Leveraged
A recent IMF study reports that best esti-
mates place the number of funds using
leverage in the range of 50 percent to 
70 percent. In addition, they report that
an estimated 85 percent of hedge funds
have a leverage ratio of two or less.8
However, in instances where leverage is
high (like LTCM), enhanced market dis-
cipline might be the answer. This could
be encouraged, for example, through
improved transparency in the operations
of hedge funds. It is notable that the use
of leverage, in and of itself, does not
imply excessive risk-taking by hedge
funds. After all, bank trading desks  that
compete with hedge funds in many mar-
kets employ much more leverage than
the average leveraged hedge fund.
Myth #2: Hedge Funds Can
Manipulate Markets
The size of the hedge fund industry,
relative to the markets in which the
funds operate, is too small for hedge
funds alone to move the market. The
total net assets of the industry are esti-
mated to be around $110 billion; there-
fore, hedge funds represent only about
½ of one percent of the $20 trillion in
investments held by institutional
investors. However, it is possible that
they may move the market because
Assume that there are two stocks (A and B) with similar risk characteristics. Each
stock costs $100 per share today; stock A is expected to sell for $110 next year,
while stock B is expected to sell for $115 next year. An investor can profit by
short-selling asset A and using the proceeds to buy asset B. Short-selling asset A
involves borrowing a share of stock A. This share is then sold, yielding $100 to
buy stock B. Tomorrow stock B is sold for $115. Of the proceeds, $110 goes to pay
back the loan of stock A, yielding a profit of $5.
Proceeds from
buying/selling Today Next year
Asset A $100 –$110
(sell short one share of A) (repayment of short sale)
Asset B –$100 $115
(buy one share of  B) (sell one share of B) 
Total 0 $5
The trader need only take a short position in asset A. An investor is considered to
have a short position in an asset when the value of that position moves inversely
with the price of the asset. Short-selling is one method of taking a short position.
Options, futures, and other derivative contracts may also be used to construct a
short position.
TABLE 1  ARBITRAGE USING SHORT SALESother investors follow their lead—an
effect referred to as “herding.” But stud-
ies of the role of hedge funds in the cur-
rency crises find little evidence that
hedge funds were the market leader—
or even the lead bull in the herd.9
Myth #3: Hedge Funds Are
Responsible for the
Currency Crises of 
the 1990s
Careful analysis of the 1992 Exchange
Rate Mechanism crisis, the 1994–95
Mexican peso crisis, and the 1997 Asian
currency crisis points to an array of fac-
tors contributing to the devaluations.
Even when hedge fund activities were a
link in the chain of events leading to a
crisis, there is no evidence that the hedge
funds caused the crises or collapses. It is
possible, for example, that hedge funds
reacted to news of changes in macroeco-
nomic policies. Moreover, at least in the
Mexican and Asian crises, domestic
investors, rather than foreign hedge fund
operators, played the lead role in dump-
ing the currency.
Myth #4: Hedge Funds Increase
Market Volatility
For hedge funds to increase volatility,
their trading behavior would have to
accentuate market swings through
positive-feedback trading behavior. That
is, they would have to sell when prices
are falling and buy when prices are ris-
ing. So far, studies have found no evi-
dence of positive-feedback trading by
hedge funds. In fact, they suggest that
hedge funds engage in negative-feed-
back trading. That is, they tend to sell or
take a short position when prices are ris-
ing and buy when prices are falling. By
providing ready counterparties to trades,
hedge funds increase the liquidity of
markets and reduce price pressures in a
falling or rising market. By doing so, the
funds’ trading behavior tends to reduce,
not increase, the volatility of prices.10
Myth #5: Hedge Funds Are a
Source of Systemic Risk
There are two ways hedge funds could
increase systemic risk: First, they could
reinforce asset bubbles, thus increasing
the size of the losses and the damage to
the financial system when the bubble
bursts. Two pieces of evidence contra-
dict this. First, as negative-volatility
traders, hedge fund managers make their
money by betting against unsustainable
movements in security prices. Hence,
not only do hedge funds not reinforce
asset bubbles, they may in fact prevent
them in the first place. Second, a recent
study by William Fung and David Hsieh
finds that hedge fund returns are largely
uncorrelated with those of mutual funds
and other asset classes—a finding that is
also inconsistent with this definition of
systemic risk.11
A second way that hedge funds could
increase systemic risk is by increasing
the risk exposure of counterparties, espe-
cially in the derivatives market. In this
scenario, a hedge fund’s failure could
impose losses on its counterparties large
enough to seriously impair their capital,
or even cause them to fail. This is the
“domino effect” variety of systemic risk.
However, counterparty risk might also be
posed by other investments. Further-
more, the transmission of a loss sizeable
enough to impair an institution’s capital
is the result of poor credit policy and
SOURCE: Chadha and Jansen (1998).
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FIGURE 1 HEDGE FUNDS BY TYPE, 1993–97
FIGURE 2 HEDGE FUND ASSETS, 1993–97control by that institution. Thus, the risk
posed by hedge funds might be dealt
with through improved regulation of
counterparties. In fact, regulatory
authorities have identified several areas
where improvement might be
warranted.12
n n Can Increased Regulation 
Be Justified?
Any economic justification for
increased regulation of hedge funds
must consider that they contribute to
market efficiency in two ways: First, the
identification of arbitrage opportunities
requires extensive research. By execut-
ing trading strategies based on their
market research, hedge funds improve
the informational efficiency of markets
by embedding that information into
market prices. Second, whether hedge
fund trades reflect an arbitrage strategy
or speculation, their active presence in
the market improves liquidity. Given
that hedge funds often bet against the
direction of the market, they provide
ready counterparties in trades and thus
help to complete the market.
The fact that hedge funds are owned by
presumably sophisticated investors who
are capable of understanding risk is key
to considering calls for increased, or
more direct, regulation. Larger, more
sophisticated investors are presumed
capable of assessing and pricing the
risks associated with their investments.
If such investors expect to reap the
gains and losses of their investments,
then they have strong incentives to
monitor the activities of firms, driving
up the cost of a firm to close. In other
words, markets should be able to effec-
tively discipline hedge funds. Further-
more, any losses accruing to investors
will be the consequence of an informed
decision and, hence, an outcome that
could reasonably be expected.
An important rationale for offering
deposit insurance is that it provides pro-
tection for smaller, less sophisticated
depositors. Coverage is limited, how-
ever, because larger depositors are pre-
sumed capable of assessing the risks of
uninsured investments. Once the gov-
ernment offers deposit guarantees, how-
ever, this becomes a compelling argu-
ment for regulating the activities of the
insured institution. As insurer, the gov-
ernment’s exposure is increased when
the insured undertakes risky activities.
This is especially true if the insurance
does not price the risk correctly.
Since higher-net-worth individuals own
hedge funds, the “unsophisticated
investor” rationale cannot be used to
offer explicit or implicit guarantees to
hedge fund investors. Therefore, as long
as hedge funds are not implicitly in-
sured by promises of government assis-
tance, this argument does not justify
regulation. Other rationales for direct
regulation—claims that hedge funds are
a threat to market integrity or pose sys-
temic risk—also appear unjustified by
the available evidence.
Somewhat different considerations arise
in addressing concerns about the expo-
sure of depository institutions, pension
funds, and trust funds to hedge funds.
Depository institutions, for example, are
recipients of federal deposit insurance.
Furthermore, the investment strategies
and risks undertaken by hedge funds are
no different than those undertaken by
other counterparties of commercial
banks, such as securities firms—or
even by the trading operations of some
money-center banks themselves. Thus,
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FIGURE 3 HEDGE FUNDS BY DOMICILE, 1997
FIGURE 4 HEDGE FUND ASSETS BY DOMICILE, 1997the risk posed to commercial banks
entering into derivatives contracts is the
same whether the counterparty is a
securities firm or a hedge fund—so
long as the bank applies the same credit
standards to its counterparty. Undue risk
exposure of a commercial bank to a
hedge fund can be addressed through
modification of the substantial regula-
tory mechanisms already in place. In-
creased regulatory scrutiny of the bank
and its risk-management system might
be appropriate—with regulatory sanc-
tions levied against the bank’s manage-
ment and board of directors. If the risks
posed by hedge funds to other financial
system participants can be contained by
existing oversight mechanisms, the
spillover effects from a hedge fund fail-
ure do not justify direct regulation.
Finally, direct regulation of hedge funds
simply may not be practical. Figure 3
shows that in 1997, 49 percent of hedge
funds were domiciled outside the United
States, and the majority of those—in-
cluding LTCM—were incorporated in
the tax havens of the Caribbean. More
importantly, figure 4 illustrates that
more than two-thirds of hedge fund
assets were controlled by funds domi-
ciled in the Caribbean. Hence, attempts
to regulate hedge funds would have lit-
tle impact on a large share of the indus-
try and would likely cause domestic
funds to relocate offshore.13  On the
other hand, when focusing on the risk-
management practices of counterparties
to hedge funds, the domicile of the
hedge fund is less of an issue.
n n Summary 
The assistance offered to Long Term
Capital Management and the role played
by hedge funds in recent currency crises
have led to calls for increased regulatory
scrutiny of their activities. Any addi-
tional regulatory burden must be bal-
anced against the benefits that hedge
funds provide by improving market effi-
ciency. Careful consideration of the reg-
ulatory issue is obscured when critics of
hedge funds rely on unsubstantiated
accusations. There is little evidence, for
example, that hedge funds caused the
Asian currency crises or that they have
increased market volatility.
A familiar argument in favor of regulat-
ing financial services firms invokes the
presence of either explicit or implicit
insurance. In the case of FDIC-insured
deposits, for example, the expected loss
to the insurer increases when the in-
sured bank makes risky investments.
This rationalizes efforts to reduce the
expected loss by regulating various
aspects of bank behavior that might
increase the expected loss to the FDIC.
This is especially true if the insurance
does not price the risk correctly.
The same argument in favor of regulat-
ing activities that increase risk and pos-
sibly the expected loss to the insurer
apply when the insurance is implicit,
rather than formal or explicit. If hedge
fund investors, for example, expect to
be rescued with government assistance
(as implicit insurance), we might worry
that their activities would be riskier
than otherwise. This would provide a
rationale for some sort of government
regulation. Other rationales for direct
regulation—claims that hedge funds
threaten market integrity or pose sys-
temic risk—also appear unjustified by
the available evidence.
The investment strategies and risk
undertaken by hedge funds are no dif-
ferent than those undertaken by other
counterparties of commercial banks,
such as securities firms—or even by
the trading operations of some money-
center banks themselves. The fact that
hedge funds are limited to wealthier,
more sophisticated investors militates
against one of the main arguments for
providing insurance to investors and,
consequently, for direct regulation. Nei-
ther does the possibility that exposure
to hedge funds might endanger the via-
bility of commercial banks, pension
funds, or trust funds justify direct regu-
lation. In fact, commercial banks’ expo-
sure to hedge funds is similar in many
ways to their exposure to risk from
other counterparties. This implies that a
more cost-effective way to monitor and
contain exposure to hedge funds is
through the existing regulatory mecha-
nism. However, the implementation of
this approach also must consider its
impact on market discipline.
n n Footnotes
1. See “Statement by William J.
McDonough, President, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, before the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House
of Representatives, October 1, 1998,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, vol. 84 (December
1998), pp. 1050–54.
2.  See “Statement by John P. LaWare, Gov-
ernor, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives, April 13, 1994,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 80 (June
1994), pp. 511–21.
3.  While hedge funds are largely unregulated,
there are some activities—such as the trading
of foreign exchange and futures contracts—
where they must report their positions.
4. See Carol L. Loomis, “The Jones No-
body Keeps Up With,” Fortune (April
1966), pp. 237–47.
5.  See Barry Eichengreen and Donald
Mathieson, “Hedge Funds and Financial
Markets:  Implications for Policy,” in Barry
Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson, eds.,
Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynam-
ics, International Monetary Fund, Occasional
Paper 166, May 1998.
6.  The short sale of a security entails bor-
rowing the security being sold. In other
words, it is a true negative position in that
security. An investor is deemed to have a
short position in an asset when the value of
that position moves inversely with the price
of the asset. Short selling is one method for
taking a short position. Options, futures, and
other derivative contracts may also be used









Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted provided that
the source is credited. Please send copies 
of reprinted materials to the editor.
10.  For evidence of negative-feedback trad-
ing, see Laura E. Kodres and Matthew
Pritsker, “Directionally-Similar Position Tak-
ing and Herding by Large Futures Market
Participants,” unpublished manuscript, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 1997.
11. See William Fung and David A. Hsieh,
“Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trad-
ing Strategies: The Case of Hedge Funds,”
Review of Financial Studies, vol. 10, no. 2
(Summer 1997), pp. 275–302.
12.  See “Statement by William J.
McDonough,” pp. 1050–54; and “Banks’
Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institu-
tions,” Bank for International Settlements,
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,
Paper No. 45, January 1999.
13. See Burton G. Malkiel and J. P. Mei,
“Hedge Funds: The New Barbarians at the
Gate,” Wall Street Journal, September 29,
1998.
7. Martin Mayer, “Bailing Out The Billion-
Bettors: How Could a Small Group of High-
Risk Traders Imperil Both Banks and
Finances around the World?” Los Angeles
Times, October 5, 1998.
8.  See Bankim Chadha and Anne Jansen,
“The Hedge Fund Industry: Structure, Size
and Performance,” in Barry Eichengreen and
Donald Mathieson, eds., Hedge Funds and
Financial Market Dynamics, International
Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 166, 
May 1998.
9.  The one exception is the 1992 ERM crisis.
While hedge funds were relatively small
players in betting on a realignment of ERM’s
fixed basket of exchange rates, one cannot
rule out the possibility that hedge funds were
the market leader. See Chadha and Jansen,
footnote 2, and Stephen J. Brown, William
N. Goetzman, and James M. Park, “Hedge
Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of
1997,” Yale University, International Center
for Finance, Working Paper, May 1998.
William P. Osterberg is a senior economist at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and
James B. Thomson is a vice president and
economist at the Bank.
The views stated herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Economic Commentary is published by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. To receive copies or to be
placed on the mailing list, e-mail your request
to maryanne.kostal@clev.frb.org or fax it to
216-579-3050. Economic Commentary is
also available at the Cleveland Fed’s site on
the World Wide Web: http://www.clev.frb.org/
research.